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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LAUREN W. GIBBS, INC., a corpo-
ration, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
E. E. "JIOXSON, Secretary of State of 
the State of Utah, JOSEPH CHEZ, 
Attorney General of the State of 
Utah, and RULON F. STARLEY, 
State Bank Commission of the State 
of Utah, as members of the Secur-
ities Commission of the State of 
Utah, and the SECURITIES COM-
MISSION OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
I. 
No. 6331 
THE ISSUES LIMITED BY BRIEF AND RECENT 
CASE 
In view of the decision handed down by this Court in 
the case of Withers v. Golding, since the filing of this 
appeal, some of the points raised by this appeal need no 
further discussion. It may now be asserted as law that 
the issues to be decided by the district court in an action 
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brought against a commission operating under a statute 
like Section 79-1-36, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, are 
''certainly not the issues raised before the commission, 
but the issues raised by the pleadings before the court.'' 
Sections 79-1-36 and 82-1-42 are identical and the 
history back of each is practically the same, and since the 
Securities Commission operates under Section 82-1-42 
the construction placed on 79-1-36 in the Withers case is 
applicable to the case at bar. The issues, therefore, are 
limited, by appellants' principal brief and respondent's 
answer brief, to these : 
1. Did the District Court have authority to sus-
pend the final order of the Securities Commission ex 
parte, without notice, and without affording a hearing 
to the Commission 1 
2. Did the District Court have authority to order a 
license to remain in force indefinitely pending determina-
tion of the cause and contrary to the provisions of the 
statutes~ 
3. Did the District Court have authority to order a 
complete transcript of the proceeding before the Com-
mission to be filed with the Court in advance of the trial, 
when the proceeding before the Court was neither an 
appeal nor a plenary review of the record, but an inde-
pendent action on issues raised by the complaint before 
the Court~ 
4. Did respondent, in its complaint, state grievances 
sufficient to raise any issues triable by the Court~ 
All these questions, we believe, are rather thoroughly 
answered in our main brief, but we may assist the Court 
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by pointing out some rerent decisions and articles show-
ing a decided trend toward fixing a general basis for 
determining the proper relationship between courts and 
commissions, ·which may not have come to the Court's 
attention. 
II. 
AD:JliXISTRATl\TE LA \Y TRENDS 
Admittedly there has been great confusion in this 
field, and that because of the rapid multiplication of 
boards and commissions which entrench upon the time 
honored functions of courts. It may be conceded at once 
that no true American wants to see our judicial system 
destroyed or ham-strung; neither does any true Ameri-
can want the wheels of progress impeded by resistance to 
necessary change in methods of control in our economic 
and social lives, under the Constitution. 
Elihu Root, while President of the American Bar 
Association, became fully aware of directional trends in 
fields of social and economic control, and because of his 
awareness felt called upon to advise the bench and bar 
as follows: 
''There is one special field of law develop-
ment which has manifestly become inevitable. We 
are entering upon the creation of a body of admin-
istrative law quite different in its machinery, its 
remedies, and its necessary safeguards from old 
methods of regu.lation by specific statutes en-
forced by the courts ... There will be no with-
drawal from these experiments ... We shall go 
on; we shall expand them, whether we approve 
theoretically or not, because such agencies furnish 
protection to rights and obstacles to wrongdoing 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
which under our new social and industrial condi-
tions cannot be practically accomplished by the 
old and simple procedure of legislatures and 
courts as in the last generation.' '-Quoted from 
next case cited. 
In the case of Federal C. C. v. Pottsville Broadcast-
ing Company, 309 U.S. 134, 84 L. ed. 656, the Supreme 
Court of the United States picked up this advice and 
enlarged upon it as follows : 
''Courts, like other organisms, represent an 
interplay of form and function. The history of 
Anglo-American courts and the more or less 
narrowly defined range of their staple business 
have determined the basic characteristics of trial 
procedure, the rules of evidence, and the general 
principles of appellate review. Modern adminis-
trative tribunals are the outgrowth of conditions 
far different from those. To a large degree they 
have been a response to the felt need of govern-
mental supervision over economic enterprise-a 
supervision which could effectively be exercised 
neither directly through self-executing legislation 
nor by the judicial process. 
'' ... To be sure, the laws under which these 
agencies operate prescribe the fundamentals of 
fair play. They require that interested parties be 
afforded an opportunity for hearing and that 
judgment must express a reasoned conclusion. 
But to assimilate the relation of these administra-
tive bodies and the courts to the relationship be-
tween lower and upper courts is to disregard the 
origin and purposes of the movement for adminis-
trative regulation and at the same time to disre-
gard the traditional scope, however far-reaching, 
of the judicial process. Unless these vital differ-
entiations between the functions of judicial and 
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administrative tribunals are observed, courts will 
stray outside their province and read the laws of 
Congress through the distorting lenses of inap-
plicable legal doctrine.'' 
· • ... In 'sharp contrast with the previous 
grant of authority' the court was restricted to 
a purely judicial review. 'Whether the Commis-
sion applies the legislative standards validly set 
up, whether it acts within the authority conferred 
or goes beyond it, whether its proceedings satisfy 
the pertinent demands of due process, whether, in 
short, there is compliance ·with the legal require-
ments which fix the province of the Commission 
and govern its action, are appropriate questions 
for judicial decision.' '' 
'' . . . . It is, however, urged upon us tha;t if 
all matters of administrative discretion remain 
open for determination on remand after reversal, 
a succession of single determinations upon single 
legal issues is possible with resulting delay and 
hardship to the applicant. It is always easy to 
conjure up extreme and even oppressive possi-
bilities in the exertion of authority. But courts 
are not charged with general guardianship against 
all potential mischief in the complicated tasks of 
government. The present case makes timely the 
reminder that 'legislatures are ultimate guardians 
of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite 
as great a degree as the courts. ' '' 
Legislatures in every State in the Union, as well as 
the Federal Congress, are exercising to an amazing de-
gree ·their right to guard over the liberties and welfare of 
the people, resulting in a multitude of statutes which 
must be followed by the courts, as well as the people, so 
long as they do not violate constitutional prohibitions. 
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In construing such statutes courts have reached all 
kinds of conclusions both as to the constitutionality and 
the scope thereof. It is comparatively easy, therefore, to 
collate authorities to support almost any point of view. 
As the statutes change in the various States, opinions 
of the courts change to accord with the statutes, and thus 
the opinions of a single State court seem to be at variance 
with themselves. 
To illustrate: California courts as early as 1897 
adopted this now modern doctrine from an earlier Con-
necticut case: 
''The doctrine perhaps cannot be better stated 
than in the language of Seymour, J ., in Dailey v. 
City of New Haven, 60 Conn. 450, 20 Atl. 666, 
this Court held that whenever bodies like boards 
of common council are acting within the limits of 
powers conferred on them, and in due form of 
law, the rights of courts to supervise, review, or 
restrain is exceedingly limited. With the exercise 
of discretionary powers, courts rarely, and only 
for grave reasons, interfere. Those grave reasons 
are found only where fraud, corruption, improper 
motives or influences, plain disregard of duty, 
gross abuse of power, or violation of law, enter 
into or characterize the result. Difference of 
opinion or judgment is never a sufficient ground 
for interference." Union Transp. Co. v. Bassett, 
118 Cal. 604; 50 Pac. 754. 
In later cases a much more restricted course is 
allowed California boards and commissions. In the very 
recent case of Drummey v. State Board, 87 Pac. (2nd) 
848, the Court, while holding that ''due process does not 
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require any particular form of notice or procedure" 
(p. 851), it also said that 
''The solution of the problein as to the proper 
remedy of those aggrieved by the action of general 
state-wide administrative boards in suspending 
or depriYing holders of existing licenses to secure 
'reYie-w' in its broadest sense, of the board's ac-
tion, is one that finds no positive answer in the 
cases heretofore decided". (P. 852) 
It having been decided in prior California cases that 
'review' is properly instituted by mandamus, it then held 
that in such review the court "must exercise its inde-
pendent judgment on the facts'', saying further: 
"\Ve think the limitations on the rule that the 
court must exercise its independent judgment on 
the facts in such cases, suggested by the United 
States Supreme Court in the St. Joseph Stock 
Yards case are sound''. (P. 854). 
This shows not only a departure from the broad 
doctrine of the earlier California cases but also a complete 
misunderstanding of the doctrine of the St. Joseph 
Stock Yards case, 298 U.S. 38, 56 S. Ct. 720, 80 L. ed. 1033. 
In that case the Court made a clear distinction be-
tween commissions handling rate cases involving confis-
cation of property, and commissions concerned only with 
licensing matters. In the former it -was held the Court may 
exercise its independent judgment on the facts, but in the 
latter the Court may not weigh the evidence at all. There 
was a dissent to this holding, but it was not in favor of 
having the Court weigh the evidence in all cases but 
rather it was in favor of denying the courts the right to 
weigh the evidence in any case. In all but rate cases, 
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both the majority and minority judges agreed that the 
functions of the courts with respect to reviewing proce-
dures of boards and commissions is as follows: 
"The court does not sit as a board of revision 
to substitute its judgment for that of the legisla-
ture or its agents as to matters within the pro-
vince of either. San Diego Land & Town Co. v. 
Jasper, 189 U.S. 439, 446, 47 L. ed. 892, 896, 23 S. 
Ct. 571; Minnesota Rate Cases (Simpson v. Shep-
ard) 230 U.S. 352, 433, 57 L. ed. 1511, 1555, 33 S. 
Ct. 729, 48 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1151, Ann. Gas. 1916A, 
18; Los Angeles Gas & E. Corp. v. Railroad Com-
mission, 289 US. 287, 304, 77 L. Ed. 1180, 1191, 53 
S. Ct. 637. When the legislature itself acts within 
the broad field of legislative discretion, its deter-
minations are conclusive. When the legislature 
appoints an agent to act within that sphere of 
legislative authority, it may endow the agent with 
power to make findings of fact which are con-
clusive, provided the requirements of due process 
which are specially applicable to such an agency 
are met, as in according a fair hearing and acting 
upon evidence and not arbitrarily. Interstat2 
Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 
227 U.S. 88, 91, 57 L. ed. 431, 433, 33 S. Ct. 185; 
Virginian R. Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 658, 
663, 71 L. ed. 463, 467, 47 S. Ct. 222; Tagg Bros. 
& Moorehead v. United States, supra (280 U.S. 
444, 74 L. ed. 537, 50S. Ct. 537); Florida v. United 
States, 292 U.S. 1, 12, 78 L. ed. 1077, 1086, 54 
S. Ct. ·603. In such cases, the judicial inquiry into 
the facts goes no further than to ascertain whether 
there is evidence to support the findings, and the 
question of the weight of the evidence in determin-
ing issues of fact lies with the legislative agency 
acting within its statutory authority." 80 L. 
ed. 1042. 
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That this is the modern trend, and the sound trend, 
1s shown by an analysis by James Hart, Professor of 
Political Science, UniYersity of Virginia, published in 
the ~larch number of the George "\V ashington Law Re-
view. He says: 
'' ":ith the gradual development of a respon-
sible bureaucracy manned by civil servants who 
by training or at least by length of experience are 
better equipped than the courts to pass judgment 
upon the technical aspects of modern regulatory 
problems, judicial review of administrative action 
should not concern itself with questions within the 
fields of administrative competence, but should 
confine itself to those questions which judges are 
better qualified than administrators to answer; 
viz., the questions that relate to the more general 
and permanent criteria of official and human con-
duct. Accordingly, the courts, when reviewing 
adminisfrative action, should never ask whether 
the administrator acted 'correctly'; for when one 
man asks that about the action of another man, 
he is in effect asking himself whether he would 
have acted the same way if he had personally been 
in the other man's place. When this is the ques-
tion asked, the judge substitutes his own judgment 
for that of the administrator, or ex hypothesi the 
judgment of a layman for that of an expert, and 
thereby tends to nullify the attainment of a prin-
cipal purpose of the legislature in substituting 
administrative for judicial enforcement of regula-
tory standards. What the courts should rather 
ask is whether the action of the administrator was 
clearly unreasonable in terms of the statutory 
purpose and of those criteria of fair play and 
right conduct which, as the cumulative result of 
long ages of common human experience, have 
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found a permanent place in civilized thought and 
acceptance.' ' 
The rest of the article deals with "Discretion in Li-
censing Cases,'' ''Rules of Evidence,'' ''Questions of 
Fact," and "Questions of Law," wherein principles are 
stated wholly in accord with positions taken in appellants' 
main brief. In his conclusion Professor Hart says: 
"Without going into an analysis of what ef-
fect the late unlamented Logan-Walter bill would 
.have, it may safely be said that the philosophy be-
hind the bill looks in a backward direction. '' 
We believe the foregoing statements of principle 
represent the best thought on the subject, and we believe 
that our legislature moved in the same direction when it 
refixed the relations between courts and commissions in 
the Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933. 
We also feel that this Court has brought itself in 
almost complete harmony with these principles in its 
recent decisions. 
Ill. 
RESPONDENT STATES NO ACTIONABLE 
GRIEVANCE 
Guided, then, by the foregoing principles and the 
decisions of this Court that the issues triable by the Court 
in a case like this are the issues raised by the complaini 
filed in the district court, we may examine the issues so 
raised. We deem it unnecessary, in view of our main 
brief, to discuss the first three issues mentioned at the 
beginning of the brief, but the fourth issue there stated 
may be examined a little further in view of the respond-
ent's brief. 
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Did respondent, in its complaint, state grievances 
sufficient to raise any issues triable by the Court f The 
grieYanres stated in the complaint as summarized by 
respondent's own Counsel as follows: 
.. A ... The Commission acted without jurisdiction, be-
cause: 
1. The Securities Act and particularly Sec. 82-
1-21, sub. 4, is unconstitutional. Brief, p. 7. 
2. The transaction which was made the basis of 
the Commission's cancellation order was ex-
empted from its control by Section 82-1-5 and 
15. Brief, p. 26. 
B. Due process ·was denied respondent at the hearing 
before the commission, because: 
1. The suspension order failed to state the facts 
of the accusation. (Complaint, Par. 4, Abs. 2.) 
2. The suspension order failed to state facts 
sustaining the accusation. (Complaint Par. 5 
and 6, Abs. 3 and 4.) 
3. The suspension order was issued contrary to 
law. (Complaint, Par. 6, Abs. 4.) 
4. The bill of particulars failed to set forth facts 
sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Com-
plaint, Par. 7, 8, 11, Abs. 4, 5, 6.) 
5. The plaintiff was not informed as to defend-
ant's informant and was not confronted with 
the complaining witness. (Complaint, Par. 9, 
Abs. 5.) 
6. The commission in arriving at its findings and 
conclusions acted irregularly in having the 
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transcript of only one side before it. (Com-
plaint, Par. 13, Abs. 8.) 
At page 42 of respondent's brief the due process 
issue is narrowed down to this : 
''If the procedure is ... an independent action, the 
important allegation of the complaint against the Com-
mission by the person aggrieved is that there are no 
grounds for revocation", and since paragraph 21 of the 
complaint alleges respondent has done no wrong a cause 
of action is stated. 
We think it no exaggeration to say that if the last 
quoted statement were the law, all any aggrieved party 
would need to do to set the district court in motion for a 
complete re-hash of every phase of the Commission's 
procedure, whether issuable or not, is to file a complaint 
with the court which says, Baby Snooks fashion, ''I ain't 
done n<:Jthing." 
But in fairness to respondent we admit that it 
alleged more than "I have done no wrong" and we think 
that its other allegations are more important. We think 
that issue ''A'' above is important if it is true. It raises 
a constitutional question, but we think it is not well 
taken. 
Issue '' B '' also raises a fair and important question, 
but that likewise is not well taken as already shown in 
our main brief. 
The Commission made an order supported by find-
ings of fraud and unworthiness, but nowhere in respond-
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ent 's brief is any charge made that the findings do not 
support the order, nor that there was no evidence to sup-
port the findings, nor that the evidence did not prepon-
derate in favor of the findings and order. This is 
natural, because there were no such charges in the com-
plaint. 
The six specific charges quoted under issue '' B '' above 
constitute the whole of the abuse of due process alleged. 
"All of " .. hich taken together", respondent says at page 
40 of its brief, "constitute such a lack of fundamental 
procedure of justice in a judicial or quasi judicial pro-
ceeding that it should be severely condemned". 
Quite the contrary is true. Examine the six charges, 
one by one, or altogether, and they disclose no abuse of 
discretion or due process at all. 
The first charge says : ''The suspension order failed 
to state the facts of the accusation,.,_ The fact is the 
suspension order says: 
"That the said Lauren W. Gibbs, Inc., form-
erly Lauren W. Gibbs Company, Real Estate, In-
surance, Securities, through one or more of its 
officers or directors have been guilty of a fraudu-
lent act in connection with the sale of certain se-
curities and has demonstrated its unworthiness to 
transact the business of a dealer in securities 
within the Sta:te of Utah." Abs. 3-4. 
If that is insufficient for a Commission whose proce-
dure is much less formal than procedure required by a 
court of law, what can be said of the suspension order 
secured by respondent from the district court suspending 
the Commission's cancellation order. It reads: 
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"Good cause appearing therefor and on mo-
tion of Counsel for p-laintiff IT IS ORDERED 
that ... the order of the defendants cancelling 
plaintiff's registration as a dealer in securities 
. . . shall be suspended and the right of plaintiff 
to do business in the State of Utah as a licensed 
dealer in securities shall continue." (Abs. 23.) 
(Italics supplied.) 
What was the good cause which moved the Court¥ 
It could have been no other than the insufficient com-
plaint, which at the time was not admitted by demurrer 
or otherwise, and the unsupported statements of Counsel. 
If that was a sufficient statement of cause for suspen-
sion, surely respondent ought not to complain about the 
carefully stated cause of suspension made by the Com-
missiOn. 
Charge 2 is the same in effect as charge 1. 
Charge 3 says : ''The suspension order was contrary 
to law". That is a mere conclusion of the pleader, the 
insufficiency of which is too apparent to require dis-
cussion. 
Charge 4 says: ''The bill of particulars failed to set 
forth facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action". 
The bill was prepared for and delivered to respondent at 
its request, but notwithstanding its possession of the bill 
it does not plead the terms of the bill either haec verba 
or in substance. Respondent treats the bill as part of 
the complaint before the Commission by alleging that it 
did not state a cause of action, and yet it failed to state 
to the district court what it contained, apparently think-
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ing that its own naked assertion that it was insufficient 
was enough. 
In the case of Doble Steam ~rotors Corporation v. 
Daugherty, :23:2 Pac. 140, cited in our main brief, the 
aggrieved party urged in his petition that the records of 
the Securities Commission would disclose certain facts 
favorable to his application, but he failed to state what 
said facts were. The Commission, by its demurrer, 
attacked this allegation as insufficient, and in passing 
upon the question the Court said: 
"It was at least incumbent upon the applicant 
to set forth in his application what the records of 
the Commissioner's own office would disclose in 
that regard, or, at the very least, to negative in 
his said application that the Commissioner's rec-
ords contained any matter contradicting or cast-
ing doubt upon its assertion ... In the absence of 
any such showing either in said application or in 
the petition before us, it would be impossible for 
this court to determine with respect to this par-
ticular statement in the petitioner's application 
whether the Commissioner, upon recourse to his 
official record, would discover certain facts so 
that the court could determine whether the Com-
missioner did or did not abuse his discretion in 
refusing his sanction to the applicant's proposal.'' 
This rule is applicable to the case at bar with respect 
to the respondent's allegation that the Bill of Particulars 
was insufficient. 
Charge 5 says: ''The plaintiff was not informed as 
to defendants' informant and was not confronted with 
the complaining witness." The record made before the 
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district court shows that the Commission itself was the 
complainant, and there is no law requiring the Commis-
sion to confront the licensee with any particular witness 
or disclose the name of any particular informant. All 
the Commission was required to do was to make its 
case by competent evidence. Authorities on this point 
will be found in our main brief. 
Charge 6 says: ''The Commission in arriving at its 
findings and conclusions acted irregularly in having the 
transcript of only one side before it''. We are unable to 
see why the point is seriously urged. The Commission is 
required to make no transcript of the testimony at all, 
and even if it were litigants are not permitted to sit in 
with the judges to watch and criticize the methods by 
which they arrive at their decisions. We apprehend that 
this Court would not appreciate the litigants' trying to 
peep in on their conferences and procedure when they 
retire to decide this case. Why, then, should rumors 
about the processes by which the Commission arrived at 
its decision be made the basis of complaint to the district 
court. Such is not the law, as is amply shown in the 
main brief. 
There are other points raised in the complaint and 
commented on in respondent's brief, but the foregoing 
are singled out by respondent itself as the gravamen of 
its case and, therefore, we confine ourselves to what 
respondent regards as important. We respectfully suh-
mit that it now appears very clear that the Utah Act is 
not unconstitutional, as complained, and that due process 
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was accorded respondent at the hearing before the Com-
mission, by reason of which the decision of the lower 
court should be reversed and the complaint of the plain-
tiff be dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GROVER A. GILES, 
Attorney General of Utah, 
DELBERT M. DRAPER, 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Appellants. 
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